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ARTICLES

Institutional Perspectives on the Allocation of
Space Orbital Resources: The ITU, Common User
Satellite Systems and Beyond
by Steven A. Levy*
I.

INTRODUCTION-"SCARCITY" AND THE CALL FOR A NEW REGIME FOR
SPACE ORBIT ALLOCATION

S pace

communication technology is no longer in its infancy. The
distribution of communications via satellite to multiple locations
across dispersed areas is within the reach of even the poorest nation.
However, the primary worldwide institutional arrangements concerned
with structuring and implementing the use and exploitation of space communications satellites rely on procedures, norms and processes that were
developed when the use of space technology for communication purposes
was the exclusive domain of only a few states. Now, by contrast, world
attention is beginning to focus upon the critical issue of the appropriate
arrangements to ensure, in a time of increasing demand for access to
space orbital and frequency resources, that all concerned parties will enjoy "equitable access" to the geostationary orbit (GSO)1 and associated
frequency resources. These demand pressures have created a growing perception of scarcity that in turn challenge the existing regime governing
access to and the use of outer space orbit and associated frequency spectrum resources for satellite communication.
Whether the international institutions concerned with the regulation
and use of the GSO can cope with the increasing proliferation of space
* Attorney, Hogan & Hartson, Washington, D.C.; J.D., University of Chicago (1978);
Ph.D. (1976), M.A. (1974), B.A. (1971), Cornell University.
' The geostationary orbit is that volume of space at an altitude of 35,786 kilometers
centered around the plane of the earth's equator in which a satellite can remain approxi-

mately fixed relative to the earth. See

NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FINAL AcTS OF THE WORLD ADmimTRATvE RADIO CONFERENCE, VOL. 1,

art. N1, § 8.13 (Geneva 1979) (unofficial version prepared for U.S. Dep't of State).
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systems remains an unresolved issue and is the focus of this article. The
growth of communication needs has stimulated demand not only for orbital access, but also for multiple systems designed to meet diverse international, regional, bilateral, domestic and commercial objectives.
The conflicts created by these demand pressures affect a wide range
of transnational interests as well as the unilateral objectives of individual
states. Although frequently framed as a conflict between technological
"have" and "have not" countries, the perceived scarcity of suitable orbit
locations and associated frequencies2 creates dilemmas that are common
to virtually all satellite-using nations. Moreover, because international
satellite communications have largely been organized through cooperative
"common user" satellite system$ undertakings that are unprecedented in
other trade sectors, it is of critical importance to consider both whether
and how these habits of cooperation-and the institutional arrangements
they have spawned-can cope with demand pressures that on the surface
seem to reflect a desire to promote unilateral undertakings in the space
communications field. The thesis here will be that cooperative undertakings must continue to be accommodated within the ITU regime for vesting rights of use of the satellite orbit, and, in fact, can better advance the
interests of most countries-both developed and developing-than would
alternative rights vesting mechanisms that purport to "guarantee" unilateral programs.
A.

Overview of the Political Climate

As of 1971, when the current International Telecommunications
Union (ITU)' assignment of geostationary orbital positions and spectrum
for space services was devised, the United States and the USSR were the
only countries capable of launching communication satellites into geostationary orbit. The International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT) was the only international system providing worldwide
service, and only a handful of domestic satellite systems were operational.
2This perceived decrease in orbital capacity does not result from the physical frequency constraints of the GSO. Rather, many technical factors, such as polarization discrim-

ination and satellite station-keeping, influence the efficiency of its use. As these technical
factors are improved, the capacity of the GSO is expected to increase. D. JANSKY, WORLD
ATLAS OF SATELLITES 44-63 (1983).
8 See infra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
The International Telecommunications Union is a multinational organization whose
purpose is "to maintain and extend international cooperation between all members.., for
the improvement and rational use of telecommunications ... [and] to promote and to offer

technical assistance to developing countries in the field of telecommunications." INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNION,

FINAL AcTs OF THE PLENIPOTENTIARY CONFERENCE,

Conv. 3 (1982) (available in the office of the Case Western Reserve Journal of International
Law) [hereinafter cited as 1982 FINAL AcTs].
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Under such conditions, few difficult access issues arose. No ITU member
administration that has sought access rights to the geostationary orbit for
the purpose of operating a fixed international or domestic satellite system
has been denied orbital access by operation of the existing ITU satellite
coordination process. 5 This process provides for the implementation and
deployment of space systems on an ad hoc basis, provided there is no
prejudice to existing or future requirements for space communications facilities.6 INTELSAT's charter gives it the prerogative of passing on the
technical impact, and in certain circumstances the economic effect, on its
operations posed by alternative international systems.7 Nevertheless, INTELSAT has yet to withhold its approval of any potentially competing
international system. 8
The appearance of surface calm, however, is misleading. The regime
may have worked well largely because of an atmosphere of perceived
abundance in which norms and standards which deal with the principle of
unencumbered orbital access are beyond practical reproach. But the surface calm belies a growing uneasiness that the legal standards and largely
ad hoc processes by which they are implemented command a diminishing
following.
Resolution 3 of the 1979 World Administrative Radio Conference
(WARC '79)9 calls in effect for a comprehensive reappraisal, at the "ORB85" conference ° to be convened next year to consider the adequacy of the
5 INTERm
WORKING PARTY 4/1, INTERNATIONAL CONSULTIVE CoMMImr=E ON RADIO, INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION, PROVISIONAL TECHNICAL REPORT FOR WARC-84,

Doc. No. 4/286-E, at 116 (June 12, 1981) (available in the office of the Case Western Reserve
Journal of International Law) [hereinafter cited as LW.P. 4/1].

6 GENERAL

SECRETARIAT, INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNION, RADIO REGULA-

TIONS, arts. 11, 13, at RR11-1 to RR11-20, RR13-1 to RR13-16 (1982) (available in the office
of the Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law) [hereinafter cited as RADIO
REGULATIONS].
Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization
"INTELSAT," Aug. 20, 1971, art. XIV, 23 U.S.T. 3813, 3853-54, T.I.A.S. No. 7532 [hereinafter cited as INTELSAT Agreement].
8 INTELSAT has, however, imposed certain limitations upon competing international
systems, particularly those serving lucrative high density routes. As concerns technical conflicts between INTELSAT and certain domestic systems, particularly in the Indian Ocean
region, the conflicts were resolved and INTELSAT ultimately relaxed the interference parameters that gave rise to the issue. See infra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
9 Resolution No. 3, Relating to the Use of the Geostationary-Satellite Orbit and the
Planning of Space Services Utilizing It, RADIO REGULATIONS, supra note 6, at RES3-1 [hereinafter cited as Resolution 3].
10 See Proceeding Before the Federal Communications Commission, An Inquiry Relating to Preparation for an International Telecommunication Union World Administrative
Radio Conference on the Use of the Geostationary-Satellite Orbit and the Planning of the
Space Services Utilizing It, Third Notice of Inquiry, General Docket No. 80-741, at 2 n.1
(Oct. 6, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Preparation for ITU WARC]. This conference, entitled
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current mechanisms for vesting rights of use of orbit and spectrum. The
Resolution was sponsored by certain technologically disadvantaged states
which fear that the current regime penalizes their present inability to
utilize space resources and allows the use and control of orbit/spectrum to
be dominated by relatively few advanced countries. On closer examination, however, there were mixed motivations. The resolution's primary
sponsors were a group of less-developed countries (LDCs) who envisioned
themselves as regional satellite leaders. They consciously preyed on the
visceral concerns of other LDCs who may have been concerned that their
present inability to use the GSO would prejudice their access in the
future.1 1
As shall be discussed below, prior use of the orbit and spectrum by
existing systems does not necessarily confer rights to maintain such use in
perpetuity. Nevertheless, the discomfiture of the LDCs over the availability of desirable frequencies at convenient locations has moved them to
call for future conferences to consider means "to guarantee in practice for
2
all countries equitable access to the ... orbit and the frequency bands.'
These countries argue that ad hoc developments simply cannot be trusted
to preserve in practice their abstract rights of access to the satellite
orbit."3
To look upon this looming conflict solely in north/south and developed/developing country terms is misleading. The greatest uncertainty
arises over the availability of positions at optimal locations that permit
the use of lower frequency bands which are most suitable for low cost
the World Administrative Radio Conference on the Use of the Geostationary-Satellite Orbit
and the Planning of Space Services Utilizing It (Space WARC), will meet in two sessions in
1985 and 1988 under the guidance of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU),
an international organization coordinating global telecommunications, of which nearly all
nations are members. The ITU short-form reference to the first session is ORB-85.
" See, e.g., Srirangan, Wireless Advisor to the Government of India, Some Thoughts on
Techno-Economic Considerations and Potentials of Orbit/Spectrum Planning for Developing Countries 12 (Paper Delivered at Inaugural Sess. of Int'l Training Course on Orbit Frequency Planning, Space Applications Centre, ISRO, Ahmedabad, Feb. 16-Mar. 6, 1981)
(available at the office of the Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law):
The present pattern of growth of satellite networks and the related step-by-step
interference coordination process inevitably place developing countries who are
usually later entrants, in a position of disadvantage. In an effort to "protect" networks which have preceded them, they have to accept constraints of some sort and
a related penalty. The question, is why should a later entrant, specially one who is
already constrained by limited resources, be in this position if he is entitled to an
equal right of access to the orbit/spectrum resource?
Id. at 13.
42 Resolution 3, supra note 9, at RES3-1.
'3 See generally Rutkowski, Six Ad-Hoc Two: The Third World Speaks Its Mind, SATELLITE

COM., Mar. 1980, at 22; Srirangan, supra note 11.
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satellite systems. 14 In terms of technology, the perception that the satellite orbital arc is diminishing may ultimately be proven false. 15 At present, the concern over orbital access is shared by the developed and the
developing world. The historic U.S. "open skies" policy," has had to be
modified to acknowledge and incorporate the fundamental scarcity of
available orbital resources. As the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has warned, "[W]e can no longer warrant that we will be able
to grant every orbital assignment that may be requested by qualified
7
applicants."'
Until the scarcity problem can be diminished by the use of new technology, difficult allocation choices, both internationally and domestically,
must be made to determine who may be eligible to utilize scarce orbital
resources. At the international level, the scarcity perception has stimulated support for comprehensive a priori planning. According to this plan,
orbital positions and frequencies would be allocated to reserve orbital positions and frequency assignments for all countries, regardless of their
present need or capability to use these resources.'" Such a regime would
represent a radical change from the status quo and would impose a con1, Primarily, the congestion is severe only in a part of the 6/4 GHz band "due, mainly,
to its relatively benign propagation characteristics and the ready availability of technology
which has become cost effective because of intensive use." INTELSAT, OBJECTivEs AND
FRAMEWORK OF REPORTS TO ADMINISTRATIONS/SIGNATORIES

OF INTELSAT's

PREPARATION

WARC-ORB-85, BG-57-66E, at 5 (Nov. 23, 1983) (available in the office of the Case
Western Reserve Journal of International Law) [hereinafter cited as OWJECTIVES AND
FOR

FRAMEWORK].

See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
In re Establishment of Domestic Communications-Satellite Facilities by Non-Governmental Entities, 22 F.C.C.2d 86 (1970) (report and order), 35 F.C.C.2d 844 (1972) (second report and order), reconsiderationgranted in part 38 F.C.C.2d 665 (1972).
1 Proceedings Before the Federal Communications Commission, Licensing of Space
Stations in the Domestic Fixed-Satellite Service and Related Revisions of Part 25 of the
Rules and Regulations, CC Docket No. 81-704, at 36, para. 76 (Apr. 27, 1983) [hereinafter
cited as Licensing of Space Stations]. The Commission in response to perceived scarcity has
implemented two comprehensive orbital assignment plans, the second at substantially reduced spacing intervals over the first. Id. at 2-3. To accommodate the second group of assignments, the FCC was forced to invoke, on extremely short notice, a strict cut-off on new
applications. In re Processing of Pending Space Station Applications in the Domestic Fixed
Satellite Service, 90 F.C.C.2d 1, 4 (1982). The FCC's most recent processing guidelines are
calculated to discourage a flood of pro-forma applications, in order to avoid the administratively exhausting task of comparative evaluation. Licensing of Space Stations, supra, at 5051, paras. 103-04. Moreover, the FCC has encouraged trading of assigned locations as a
means of allowing the marketplace to rectify deficiencies in the Commission's assignment
plan. Id.
'" Cf. Resolution 3, supra note 9, at RES3-1 (admitting the need for equitable access
'5
'6

while noting that "the use of the . . . satellite orbit by individual countries ...

can take

place at various points in time, based on . . .the availability of the resources at their
disposal").
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siderable detriment to those countries that have become accustomed to
the relatively loose regulation of the present order. The existing regime
has given them, as early entrants, the advantage of almost automatic access to GSO and frequency resources.
Whether such formal, and potentially limiting, procedures would be
an improvement over the present regime by allocating frequencies, positions, coverage areas, power and other parameters of operation on strictly
a country-by-country basis has never been conclusively established. All
states do not necessarily require nor insist upon dedicated allocations and
their needs may, moreover, best be served by collective access. The compromises that will be necessary to reconcile all the conflicting claims may
be such as to leave all participants worse off than they are in the present
ad hoc coordination regime.1 9 Diminishing resources and mutually exclusive claims of entitlement are not circumstances that lend themselves to
Pareto optimality." On the other hand, a "common user" approach2
which recognizes that many, if not all, national and international service
requirements may be met on a collective basis, can work best if multilateral systems are given explicit recognition in whichever allocation system
is devised.
B. Opportunity and Conflict-National Objectives versus Common
User Approach
It is problematic whether selective, common user approaches to orbital access can coexist with the nationalist sentiments that drive the movement toward alternate ITU regimes for orbit/spectrum resource allocation. The position of the principal supporters of Resolution 3 is that
equitable access to the GSO can best be assured through a regime of prior
designations of specific slots and frequencies on a country-by-country basis.22 However, this view completely fails to recognize that in practice
sovereign countries have chosen to achieve their access requirements and
objectives through participation in common user systems operated under
the auspices of multilateral institutions. From the standpoint of almost
every country, the major providers of satellite services now and in the
foreseeable future will be multi-user systems involving almost all ITU
'"See COMMUNICATIONS STUDIES AND PLANNING INTERNATIONAL, INC., WARC '77 AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR RARC '83, at 1-5 sec. 11 (Apr. 1983) (report for the U.S. Delegation to the
Regional Administrative Radio Conference) (available in the office of the Case Western Re-

serve Journal of International Law) [hereinafter cited as WARC '77 IMPLICATIONS].
"0 V. PARETo, MANUEL D'EcONOMIC POLITIQUE (1909), cited in E. MANSFIELD,
MICROECONoMIcs 433 (1970) ("A change that harms no one and improves the lot of
some . .. is an improvement . .
").
See infra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
22 See Resolution 3, supra note 9.
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members. Moreover, there are strong technical, economic and political arguments for giving explicit recognition to multi-user systems as favoring
technical and economic efficiencies in the use of spectrum and geostationary orbit.2 3

The oversight in Resolution 3 may be no accident. The most vocal
proponents of a priori planning, India, Indonesia and Brazil, have sought
to enhance the international service dimension of their domestic systems
in direct competition with common user international systems as a means
of promoting their regional influence. Tension between these regional
states, on the one hand, and INTELSAT, on the other, has developed in
recent years regarding spectrum and geostationary orbit assignments
within the limited portions of the geostationary arc useful for international service. 24 The ambitions of these countries impel them to attempt
to enhance their option to build separate domestic and regional systems
in which they enjoy a far more prominent role than would be possible in a
25
universal body, such as INTELSAT.

Most ITU member states, particularly LDCs, would be wise to reject
narrowly-based a priori orbit and spectrum assignment approaches, particularly assignments by country. Such a regime explicitly fails to recognize the needs and requirements of common user systems for access to
orbit and spectrum resources necessary to satisfy the common and dedicated service requirements of their member states. The principal common
user systems 26 function under the joint sponsorship and direction of their
membership and are organized pursuant to international treaties.27 Mem23

OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, RADIO FREQUENCY USE AND MANAGEMENT, IM-

PACTS FROM THE WORLD ADMINIsTRATrvE RADIo CONFERENCE OF 1979, at 121-23 (1982) [hereinafter cited as OTA REPORT].
24 See OBJECTiES AND FRAMEWORK, supra note 14, at 2. Other countries are motivated

purely by nationalistic aspirations. For example, some countries have asserted sovereignty
over those segments of the geostationary orbit that lie directly over their respective territories. See Final Minutes of the Second Meeting of Equatorial Countries on the Geostationary

Orbit 7 (Apr. 8, 1982); Gorove, The GeostationaryOrbit: Issues of Law and Policy, 73 AM.
J. INT'L

L. 444, 450-59 (1979).

25 See Levy, INTELSAT: Technology, Politics and the Transformation of a Regime,

29 INT'L ORGANIZATION 655 (1975).
26 The principle common user systems are the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), the International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT), the European Telecommunications Satellite Organization (EUTELSAT) and the INTERSPUTNIK International System and Organization of Space Communications
(INTERSPUTNIK).
2 See, e.g., INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 7; Convention on the International
Maritime Satellite Organization [hereinafter cited as INMARSAT Agreement], Sept. 3,
1976, 31 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 9605; Agreement on the Constitution of a Provisional European Telecommunications Satellite Organization "INTERIM EUTELSAT" [hereinafter
cited as EUTELSAT Agreement], May 13, 1977, reprintedin SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, 95TH. CONG., 2D SESS., SPACE LAW, SELECTED BASIC Docu-
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ber states exercise direct control over service policy and organizational
objectives through a common decision-making structure which is endowed with judicial personality that transcends individual sovereign interests.2 8 Unlike national domestic systems, such as PALAPA (whose capacity may be used for regional, as well as domestic service
requirements),29 common or multi-user systems are designed to weigh at
least proportionately, if not equally, the interests of all of the sovereign
countries affected by and involved in their operation.3 0
Apart from the participatory aspects of these institutions, in which
all countries, including the United States, its allies and other countries
that rely on their services have a vested interest, the common user approach reflects the technological logic of modern space systems. As FCC
Advisory Committee studies have demonstrated, the expanding demand
for satellite capacity does not require corresponding increases in the number of geostationary slots, given the emergence of technologies that support shared frequency use and reuse at a particular location.3 1 Space platform and cluster satellite techniques point to more efficient multiple and
common use of a single orbital location. Even in today's environment, a
hybrid INTELSAT satellite can provide C and Ku Band capacity for
both international and domestic fixed and international maritime mobile
service.3 2 The notion of dedicated country-by-country orbit and frequency
reservations on the basis of a detailed and rigid international plan simply
does not mesh with these emerging service practices. Future optimal development of multi-purpose and multiple use technologies presupposes
greater reliance on common user arrangements.
[hereinafter cited as SPACE LAW DOCUMENTS] 469 (Comm. Print 1978); Agreement on
the Establishment of the "INTERSPUTNIK" International System and Organization of
Space Communications [hereinafter cited as INTERSPUTNIK Agreement], Nov. 15, 1971,
reprinted in SPACE LAW DOCUMENTS, supra, at 385.
28 INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 7, 23 U.S.T. at 3840 (art. X); INMARSAT
Agreement, supra note 27, 31 U.S.T. at 10 (art. 15); EUTELSAT Agreement, supra note 27,
SPACE LAW DOCUMENTS at 475-76 (art. 8); INTERSPUTNIK Agreement, supra note 27,
MENTS

SPACE LAW DOCUMENTS at 390-92 (art. 12).
2 PALAPA is the popular name of the Indonesian domestic communications satellite

system.
30 INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 7, 23 U.S.T. at 3824-47 (arts. VI-XI); INMARSAT Agreement, supra note 27, 31 U.S.T. at 6-11 (arts. 9-16); EUTELSAT Agreement,
supra note 27, SPACE LAW DOCUMENTS at 474-76 (arts. 7-8); INTERSPUTNIK Agreement,
supra note 27, SPACE LAW DOCUMENTS at 390-92 (art. 12).
31 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS

COMMISSION,

FIRST ADVISORY COMMITrEE REPORT, ITU

WARC ORB 85, at 2-13 (Dec. 1983) [hereinafter cited as FCC ADVISORY COMMITTEE
REPORT].
22 International Communication and Information Policy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Arms Control, Oceans, InternationalOperationsand Environment of the Senate
Comm. on ForeignRelations, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 136 (1983) (testimony of Richard Colino,
Director General, INTELSAT) [hereinafter cited as Int'l Communication Hearing].
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For these reasons, the United States should press for spectrum and
orbital assignment procedures that provide a legal means of affording recognition of the resource needs of common user institutions. For several
reasons, this will be a difficult but necessary negotiating factor at ORB85. The first reason is that the ITU convention affords rights and recognition with respect to frequency and geostationary orbit use only by the
sovereign countries that comprise its membership. The status of multiuser organizations is correspondingly weaker. Secondly, the history of
Resolution 3 and, in particular, the attitudes of its primary Third World
sponsors does not encourage the prospect for major proposals to
strengthen multi-user access.
Nevertheless, as demonstrated in this article, the present scheme of
bilateral coordination under Articles 11 and 13 of the ITU Radio Regulations accommodates, to a significant extent, the objectives of those ITU
members who wish to rely on international common user organizations.
This scheme allows the institutions to actively participate in the process
through the device of a Notifying Administration, which can act on behalf
of the international institution.3 3 Moreover, the ITU coordination procedures are explicitly accounted for in the treaties and agreements that control the principal common user institutions.3 4 Finally, the ITU processes
are legally consistent with the rights and duties created under these treaties with respect to the reconciliation of the use of the orbit and frequency by these institutions and their member states.
By contrast, a priori planning proposals as presently conceived virtually ignore common user systems as such. The problem that arises is that
such regimes recognize only member states as eligible recipients of assignments of orbit/spectrum, whereas a very large part of the international
communications of ITU member states is met through the facilities of
international common user institutions. Even if this deficiency could be
surmounted, under a priori approaches or variants thereof, such as arc
segmentation, 35 the range of services that might be provided at a given
33RADio REGULATIONS, supra note 6, at RR11-1 to RR11-20 (art. 11) and RR13-1 to
RR13-16 (art. 13).
3 INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 7, 23 U.S.T. at 3844 (art. X(a)(xxiii)); INMARSAT Agreement, supra note 27, 31 U.S.T. at 6 (art. 8(4)); EUTELSAT Agreement, supra
note 27, SPACE LAw Docuhmirrs at 471 (preamble); INTERSPUTNIK Agreement, supra
note 27, SPACE LAW DocuhMirs at 389 (art. 7).
31In arc segmentation, portions of the orbital arc would be allocated for international,
regional or domestic systems exclusively. See I.W.P. 4/1, supra note 5, at 98. However, the
arc does not lend itself to such rigid compartmentalization. For example, satellites in the
U.S. "domestic" arc can be used readily for international and regional services. See, e.g., In
re Application of American Satellite Company, 88 F.C.C.2d 178 (1981); In re Application of
Satellite Business Systems, 88 F.C.C.2d 195, 198 (1981). Conversely, INTELSAT provides
domestic services to over 20 countries from orbital positions selected for their international
service potential. See INTELSAT Doc. BG-55-38E, Attachment 1 (June 1983).
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location may be limited to those specifically identified by a plan.
C. Reform Alternative
To expect that the current coordination regime will continue unchanged is unrealistic, although the establishment of new mechanisms for
vesting international rights using the existing regime as a legal benchmark is feasible. Specifically, bilateral consultations between and among
sovereign states and common user organizations, conducted under ITU
auspices, remain the basic mechanism for the resolution of conflicting requirements for orbit and spectrum. At the same time, specific elements of
the existing regime should be reconstituted to modify those features
which are objectionable to developing states and to introduce procedures
that accommodate the growing role of international common user systems. The ORB-85 agenda does not call for the adoption of particular
planning methods.36 The principal U.S. objective in 1985, therefore,
should be to persuade the world community to articulate principles that
would allow the present coordination regime to be preserved.
The criticism of the existing regime as a self-perpetuating scheme for
the benefit of advanced countries can be partially defused. Appropriate
recognition must be given to the fact that in practice virtually all countries satisfy at least some of their requirements for space services through
common user arrangements. Indeed, this concept can have strong appeal
to a growing number of developing states. Specifically, recent proposals to
meet Third World satellite requirements, particularly along "thin"
routes,3 7 confirm that these needs often can be satisfied both through new
and existing international common user systems."' The alternative for
those countries currently unprepared to construct their own dedicated
systems would be to rely on the domestic systems of neighboring countries over which they have no administrative, operational or legal control.
Proponents of preserving the existing regime to the fullest extent,
such as the United States, must be prepared to make the necessary concessions to preserve the essential aspects of the existing regime. These
countries must support revisions to the existing regulations that favor existing, rather than proposed, systems. Unless changed, certain provisions
of the ITU regulations can be construed as allowing priority access on a
38

Preparation for ITU WARC, supra note 10, at 1-3 app. B. The agenda specifically

authorizes the First Session of ORB-85 to establish "guidelines for regulatory procedures
pertaining to space services" and to consider alternative approaches to "planning" to meet
the equitable access objectives of Resolution 3. Id. at 2 app. B.

"' That is, routes with relatively limited traffic volumes.
E.g., INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION, TELECOMMUNICATION FOR DEVELOP-

MENT 88-91 (June 1983) (available in the office of the Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law) [hereinafter cited as TELECOMMUNICATIONS FOR DEV LOPMENT].
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first-come, first-serve basis. 9 Rather, the intent of the regulations should
be clarified to emphasize the mutual responsibility of existing and proposed systems to accommodate one another's orbit and frequency requirements. At the same time, as a legal matter, the United States should
be prepared to advocate the position that conflicts between individual
states and common user institutions should be resolved consistently with
any independent treaty obligations imposed by the charter of the common user organization. A corollary of this proposition holds that when a
conflict exists between a common user system and a state that is not
bound by a treaty, equitable access objectives are satisfied by any accommodation that confers the greater good to the greater number of states.
Thus, common user systems, as defined herein, would have rights equal
to, but not necessarily greater than, those of independent systems sponsored by individual administrations acting outside of a common user
framework.
The foregoing principles should be integrated into the existing coordination procedures. For example, they should frame any recommendations to be made by the International Frequency Registration Board
(IFRB) or such other ITU organ that may be designated to assist in the
resolution of those conflicts where bilateral processes have failed to produce a consensus among the affected parties.
A complete resolution of the controversy surrounding the current coordination mechanisms requires more than incorporation of these principles in the existing framework. Apart from the political undercurrents
underlying Resolution 3 of WARC '79,4o the growth and proliferation of
satellite systems and technology have created demand pressures that may
strain the capacity of the existing regime to process and resolve all competing claims. Therefore, the creation of one or more institutional checks
upon the coordination process should be instituted. These safeguards
should be designed to address the concern that the bilateral system, as a
practical matter, deprives the less technologically advanced states of direct access to the GSO. These checks could include a range of alternatives, such as periodic review of the results of the coordination process by
the IFRB, or other appropriate ITU organs, from the perspective of equitable access principles to be developed at ORB-85.
Alternatively, the review responsibility could be vested in periodic
regional or world administrative conferences with provision for ongoing
ITU expert monitoring of future spectrum and orbit needs of its members. However, the existing coordination mechanisms would remain the
initial vehicle for the vesting of orbit/spectrum rights in lieu of turning
the decision-making process over to the less predictable, and more rigid,
1" See infra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
40 See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
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operation of a world conference. This proposal is consistent with Method
4 proposed by the Interim Working Party 4/1 (IWP 4/1). Method 4 recommends that bilateral consultations under current procedures be subject
to interim adjustments of assigned orbit locations and frequencies
through multilateral conferences as service requirements and objectives
become better defined. 41 However, this recommendation would limit the
function of any such periodic conference to the evaluation of the results
of bilateral coordination in terms of their conformity with equitable access principles, including those that give due recognition to international
common user systems. In effect, this article recognizes, as does the Federal Communications Commission, that the current procedures create an
ad hoc "plan. '4 2 Defenders of the status quo must nevertheless be prepared to allow political adjustments of the results of that process through
the intervention of the ITU, whether by means of an existing organ or
through the intervention of special regional or world conferences convened for the narrow purpose of recommending such adjustments.
II.

INSTITUTIONAL IMPACTS: OVERVIEW

In the circumstances of perceived orbit and spectrum scarcity, the
institutional stakes are formidable. The legitimacy and credibility of the

International Telecommunications Union (ITU) as an authoritative institution is certainly at stake because orbital and spectrum assignment policies necessarily embody value judgments concerning political rights that
control current coordination procedures.
As the Chairman of the U.S. delegation to the 1979 World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC '79) explained:
If economic efficiency were the sole consideration, the task of developing
an optimal allocations scheme would be difficult enough given the many
different communications services that must be accommodated in any
given portion of the spectrum....
In international negotiations, however, the difficulty of constructing
an efficient set of allocations.., is almost the least problem. Far greater
is the problem of accommodating the demands of different nations in
varying stages of technological and economic development, not to mention divergent political perspectives."'
This task is becoming increasingly difficult, particularly as dominant
communications states, including the United States, begin to feel disaf41 I.W.P. 4/1, supra note 5, at 101-02.
42 See Preparation for ITU WARC, supra note 10, at 11, para. 25; Licensing of Space

Stations, supra note 17, at 25, para. 56.
43 Robinson, Regulating International Airwaves: The 1979

18-19 (1980).

WARC, 21 VA. J.
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fected by a perceived shift within the organization from emphasis
upon
44
efficiency objectives to the pursuit of more overt political aims.
The political argument for a priori planning ignores the practical reality that access to the geostationary orbit/spectrum is achieved through
a variety of institutional alternatives. These include international, regional and shared use of domestic systems. To the extent that each country presently enjoys the ability to meet its foreseeable domestic and international requirements for space communication service by resort to any
or all of these options, equitable access objectives may technically be
achieved without requiring detailed country-by-country orbit/spectrum
allotments. Less developed states, in particular, tend to rely more heavily
on regional or global alternatives to dedicated systems. They have not
been coerced into such reliance but, rather, have been attracted by the
greater efficiencies and economies of operation of shared user arrangements that conform with actual service requirements and objectives.
Despite the rhetoric in favor of dedicated allotments, the common
user approach, as described by the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment
(OTA), has increasingly come to characterize orbit/spectrum development. As the OTA has explained, such an approach to satellite system
development and management presents "an alternative to contention for
geostationary satellite orbit slots. '45 The OTA relies on the fact that although many countries have a visceral concern that satellite orbit locations are rapidly being preempted on a first-come, first-serve basis, their
requirements are for satellite service, not satellite orbit locations. 46 The
OTA thus recommends that geostationary orbit (GSO) planning be based
on the assumption that domestic satellite capacity will in all likelihood be
made available to such states on a joint use basis under an existing global
institution such as INTELSAT or through other institutions modeled after the global body.47 Currently, such a trend is manifest both in terms of
the increasing use, and ultimately the conscious planning, of multilateral
systems to provide regional or domestic services for the benefit of individ48
ual member states or groups of states.
As a legal matter, equitable access is not necessarily defined in terms
of entitlements of individual states. Indeed, the preamble of the basic
charter of INTELSAT, a major common user institution, establishes that
INTELSAT was created "with the aim of achieving a single global commercial telecommunications . . . network" providing "the most efficient
4 See Study of Long Range International Telecommunications and Information Goals
of the United States, 47 Fed. Reg. 49,694 (1982).
41 OTA RFPORT, supra note 23, at 121.
46 Id. at 122.
47 Id. at 122-23.
48 FCC ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 31, at 4-15.
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and economic facilities possible consistent with the best and most equitable use of radio frequency spectrum and of orbital space."49 In addition to
pursuing its primary objective of providing international public telecommunications services within the meaning of its charter, INTELSAT has
promoted on a collective basis the individual service aspirations of a number of its member states. The INTELSAT Agreement authorizes the provision of capacity for "domestic public telecommunications services on a
non-discriminatory basis to the extent that the ability of INTELSAT to
achieve its prime objective is not impaired."' 0 Since 1975, INTELSAT
has provided domestic lease capacity to more than twenty countries pursuant to this provision."
There are a number of existing and proposed common user alternatives. Many of these, like INTELSAT, are associated with a multilateral
institutional arrangement which must be accommodated within the present or any future rights vesting mechanism for access to geostationary
orbit. Thus, the current Secretary-General of ITU has proposed a system
sharing concept denominated GLODOM.52 Its name reflects a global ap-

proach to the major telecommunication challenge of bringing low cost domestic telecommunication service to developing countries." GLODOM
involves common user sharing of technology and5 4common management
and operation of the associated satellite facilities.
Conversely, domestic satellite systems are consistently adapted to
satisfy the requirements of other countries and even to provide regional
services. 55 International rights vesting regimes therefore must also provide flexibility to enable the evolution of particular systems to satisfy service requirements that may not have been envisioned when the systems
were initially planned or launched.
Moreover, new technology makes it less appropriate over time to attempt to classify facilities in terms of a rigid set of service criteria. Space
platforms will accommodate domestic and international requirements on
a single facility, thus making optimal use of the orbit/spectrum resources
41 INTELSAT Agreement,
90 Id. at 3820 (art. III(c)).

supra note 7, 23 U.S.T. at 3814 (preamble).

51See supra notes 35 and 48.
52 TELECOMMUNICATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT, supra note 38, at 78. GLODOM is an ab-

breviation for "global" and "domestic." Id.
53 Id.
See id. at 78-79.

For example, U.S. and Canadian dofnestic systems are available to meet bilateral
requirements and to provide backup capacity for each country's domestic needs. As acknowledged in a 1972 United States-Canada agreement, "special circumstances [exist]
where it would be in the interest of... our countries not to preclude our domestic telecommunications systems from providing assistance to one another." U.S. and Canada Clarify
Agreement on Telecommunications Satellites, 68 DEP'T ST. BuLL. 145, 146 (1973).
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at a single orbital location.5 6 Such developments, coupled with refinements in interconnectivity of satellite systems, portend that the notion of
a single purpose domestic, regional or international system is fast becoming obsolete. 57 The trend of satellite system development would proceed
more rapidly toward integrated, multipurpose networks, but for the political, strategic or commercial motivations to maintain separate facilities
under the aegis of individual states. A technologically driven orbit/spectrum planning regime would eschew any constraints upon flexibility necessary to accommodate integrated approaches and to allow for their
evolution over time. Such rationality is dramatically opposed to equitable
access guarantee proposals that necessarily fix the development of systems to those service applications and coverage accounted for in a dedicated orbit/spectrum assignment to a sovereign country, particularly since
new technologies, like space platforms, will likely be organized under the
auspices of multilateral institutions.58
The sufficiency of the present, or any proposed alternative international, regime concerned with the coordination, management or regulation of the use of a satellite orbit should be judged in terms of its ability
to afford adequate recognition to the multiplicity of potential actors that
will serve as vehicles for access. The regime must also possess flexibility
to allow the systems to evolve to serve a variety of requirements beyond
those that prompt their initial establishment.
Whether present institutions involved in the management of space
communications and the allocation of the relevant resources are sufficient, should the existing coordination procedure be changed radically, is
The European Space Agency is proceeding with the definition phase of an "L-Sat"
facility in response to a number of converging factors including:
[1. The] increase in capacity requirements for satellites dedicated to a single

type of service;
[2. The] increase in demands on satellite design sophistication to find ways
around the shortage of spectrum as service demands grow;,
[3. The] introduction of new types of satellite-based service operating with
small ground terminals and hence putting more demands on the space segments;
[4. The] use of a single satellite to support several payloads dedicated to
different service types over the same coverage area, leading to space segment
economies; [and]
[5. The] use of a single satellite with a general purpose-type payload for
several types of service, again for economic reasons.

B. Herdan, Programme Manager, European Space Agency, European Multipurpose Telecommunication Satellite: Development Plans 205, 208 (1980) (published by American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc., No. 80-0508) (emphasis added).
57 A. Rutkowski, Office of Science and Technology, Federal Communications Commission, The Impact of New Technology on Satellite Radiocommunication (Nov. 10, 1982).
as D. Smith, Institutional Configuration for Large Space Communications Structures: A
Basis for the Development of International Space Communications Norms 5-7 (1979) (pre-

pared for the International Commission for the Study of Communications Problems).
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not clear. Although it is a regime that is rooted in considerations of national sovereignty that are increasingly removed from the reality of space
system exploitation and development, the present regime has been able,
due to its flexibility, to develop a basis to afford protection to national,
non-national and multilateral systems. A shift toward a more rigidly
structured environment may preclude this flexibility.
III. THE BASIC ITU INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Although it is properly regarded as the primary international agency
for the harmonization of international practices in the telecommunications sector, the ITU has not been constituted as a supranational regulatory regime. Lacking even a permanent charter, 59 its Convention, as modified at the periodic Plenipotentiary Conference recently held in Nairobi,
embraces as a basic principle the "sovereign right of each country to regulate its telecommunication[s]." 60 Consistent with the historical reluctance
of member states to endow it with an authoritative role, decision-making
responsibility within the ITU is dispersed among a variety of organs arranged in a complex institutional structure.6 1 Accordingly, ITU's member
states have not delegated their sovereignty to a permanent ITU commission or other standing organ. The Plenipotentiary Conferences, at which
each member delegation casts a single vote, are retained as the "supreme
organ" of the ITU.6 2 The International Frequency Registration Board
(IFRB), the organ that is central to the ITU's international radio regulation function, is not empowered to exercise authoritative control over
ITU members' use of spectrum.6 3 Instead, the IFRB oversees a process of
bilateral coordination of spectrum utilization within parameters defined
by the ITU Convention and Radio Regulations.6 In addition, the IFRB
manages conflict resolution among competing sovereign claims for spectrum use and associated satellite orbital positions. 6 5 Although its tasks
59

In contrast with a charter type organization, consisting of a permanent constitution

and very strict and limited procedures for amendment, the ITU's Convention is subject to
periodic review, modification and amendment by simple majority vote of member states at
regularly scheduled Plenipotentiary Conferences. Article 6 of the Convention requires such
conferences to be held at least every five and no less than every six years. 1982 FINAL ACTS,
supra note 4, at Conv. 5.
60 Id. at Cony. 1 (preamble).
61

See Jacobson, ITU: A Potpourriof Bureaucratsand Industrialists,in R. Cox & H.

JACOBSON, THE ANATOMY OF INFLUENCE: DECISION MAKING IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

59, 61 (1973).
62 International Telecommunication Convention, Oct. 25, 1973, art. 5, 28 U.S.T. 2495,
2513, T.I.A.S. No. 8572 [heieinafter cited as ITU Convention].

See Robinson, supra note 43, at 8-9.
4 See Jacobson, supra note 61, at 75.

6

65 Id.
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are largely ministerial, within narrow limits the IFRB is empowered to
render substantive judgments pertaining to an administration's conformity with the applicable procedures for establishing rights to use of particular frequencies.6 6 The IFRB may also reach findings regarding the potential for harmful interference.6 7 However, the IFRB's overall role and
function indicates that its authority over member conduct derives from
procedural regulation rather than from decision-making edicts.
Rights vesting in the area of frequency/orbital use is presently governed by two overriding principles: (1) the right to international protection from "harmful interference,"6 8 and, (2) the need for conformity between the ITU Convention and Regulations. These principles permeate
the text of both instruments.69 Thus, the Regulations provide that member administrations "shall not assign to a station any frequency in derogation of either the Table of Frequency Allocations... or the other provisions of these Regulations, except on the express condition that harmful
interference shall not be caused to services carried on by stations operating in accordance with the provisions of the Convention and of these Regulations.17 0 The procedures defined in the Convention and Regulations
provide the mechanism for securing interference-free use of radio
resources.
The IFRB's institutional role is primarily to confirm or ratify the
outcome of the governing process rather than to adjudicate or enforce the
non-interference obligation. Thus, as has been noted, one of the IFRB's
important functions is to judge whether a planned introduction of frequency assignment has met the relevant procedural protocols.71 On the
other hand, the Regulations are designed so that the affected member
administrations initially address the issue of harmful interference7 2 with
the IFRB intervening principally in the event that bilateral coordination
has broken down.73 The IFRB's ultimate findings on a given use of frequency are intended to confirm the end result of the bilateral process 7 4 by
appropriate notification in the Master Register. While the degree of compliance with ITU procedures and technical parameters may affect the
68

Id.

67

Id.

68 The Radio Regulations define harmful interference as that which "seriously degrades, obstructs, or repeatedly interrupts a radiocommunicationservice operating in accordance with these Regulations." RADIo REGULATIONS, supra note 6, at RR1-21 (art. 1, § 7.4,
para. 163). See also id. at RES68-1 (Resolution 68).
'9 See, e.g., supra notes 6 and 62.
70 RADIO REGULATIONS, supra note 6, at RR6-1 to RR6-2 (art. 6, § 4, para. 342).
71 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
72 See generally RADIO REGULATIONS, supra note 6, at RR11-1 to RR11-20.
73 See, e.g., id. at RR13-3 to RR13-4 (art. 13, § 8, paras. 1502-05).
74 Id. at RR13-11 to RR13-12 (art. 13, § 20, paras. 1552-56).

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.

Vol. 16:171

IFRB's classification of an entry for registration purposes,75 actual causation of interference does not preclude an ITU administration from insisting that its facility be listed in the Master Register.7 Cessation of use of
a frequency over an extended period or use that does not conform to previously notified characteristics can provoke cancellation or modification
of an entry in the Master Register."
IV.

LEGAL SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROVERSY OVER THE RIGHTS
VESTING PROCESS

An evaluation of the adequacy of the existing rights vesting regime
for frequency and orbital assignments should not be framed in terms of
traditional international issues such as the conflict between community
goals and sovereign prerogatives. Rather, the fundamental issues must be
assessed in terms of the adequacy of the bilateral consultation system,
embodied in the present regime, to satisfy all competing claims of use.
The current process gives minimal consideration to issues other than interference protection and conformance with the established rules.
The process is ostensibly neutral as applied to countries in varying
stages of development. The procedures do not tend to perpetuate the advantages of the first user of spectrum."8 More importantly, the regulations
allow a variety of institutional user arrangements. They protect unilateral, multilateral, shared or common user satellite systems equally. Because the ITU is nation-state oriented, the natural question is whether a
more rigid and detailed scheme of frequency allotments under ITU auspices would adequately recognize common user alternatives, which might
conserve scarce orbit/spectrum resources.
Current ITU procedures are largely unchanged from those originally
adopted at the 1971 Extraordinary Conference.7 9 They are designed to
implement the equitable access notions subsequently endorsed in Article
33 of the 1973 Convention. 0 By defining equitable access in terms of
countries' "needs and the technical facilities at their disposal," the pre75 For example, all frequency assignments put in use are entered into column 2(c) of
the Register. Id. at RR13-12 (art. 13, § 22, para. 1558). Those that do not conform with ITU
requirements may be provisionally entered with a special notation in the remarks column.
Id. at RR13-11 (art. 13, § 20(5), para. 1556).
7' Article 13, § 22(2), para. 1559 requires cessation of interfering operations, but does
not require cancellation of registration. Id. at RR13-12.
7 See id. at RR13-13 to RR13-14 (art. 13, §§ 25-29, paras. 1569-75).
78 Compare G. CODDING & A. RUTKOWSKI, THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION
UNION IN A CHANGING WORLD 275 (1983), with D. LEIVE, INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL

LAW: THE REGULATION OF THE RADIO SPECTRUM 55-62 (1970).

Final Acts of the World Administrative Radio Conference for Space Telecommunications, July 17, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 1527, T.I.A.S. No. 7435.
80 ITU Convention, supra note 62, 28 U.S.T. at 2529, T.I.A.S. No. 8572.
"'
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sent regime emphasizes the requirements of those countries, or groups of
countries, which can establish the near term or present capability to exploit orbit/spectrum resources." Existing users are protected against future applications that portend potentially harmful interference or otherwise may be inconsistent with ITU regulations and procedures."2 Indeed,
harmful interference is defined in terms of degradation, obstruction or
repeated interruption to an existing "radiocommunicationservice operating in accordance with these Regulations.""3 The regulations simultaneously contemplate that existing users will accommodate new entry, although the onus initially falls upon proposal for new use.
The existing regime thus is not a first-come, first-serve system that
forecloses subsequent entry. Subsequent users are obliged "to explore all
means of meeting [their] requirements, taking into account the characteristics of the geostationary satellite networks of other systems, and without considering the possibility of adjustment to systems of other administrations."84 However, if no such means can be found, the administration
concerned is free to apply to other administrations to solve these difficulties.8 5 Prior users are required to consider adjustments to their systems to
accommodate the access requirements of the requesting party, including
"relocating one or more of its own geostationary space stations involved,
or by changing the emissions, frequency usage . . . or other technical or
operational characteristics."8' 6 These practical obligations are reflected
more generally in Resolution 2 of the WARC-'79 Final Acts.8 7 The resolution reflects a measure of sensitivity to concerns that the present inability
of developing states to make use of satellite orbits will allow others to
completely consume available orbits.88 The resolution addresses this issue
directly:
[H]aving in mind that the use of the allocated frequency bands and
fixed positions in the geostationary-satellite orbit by individual countries
or groups of countries can start at various dates depending on the requirements and readiness of technical facilities of countries;
resolves (1) that registration with the IFRB of frequency assign81 Id. at 2529-30 (emphasis added). The regulations have not as yet been modified to
take account of the revisions to article 33 adopted at Nairobi in 1982. These revisions replace the reference to needs and ability, with a proviso that defines equitable access in
terms of stage of development and special geographic situation. 1982 FINAL AcTs, supra note

4, at Cony. 24 (art. 33, para. 131).
82 See infra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
83

See RADIO

88

See, e.g., id. at RR11-2 (art. 11, § 3(2)(a), para. 1051) (emphasis added).
Id.

88
87

REGULATIONS,

supra note 6, at RR1-21 (art. 1, § 7.4).

Id. at RR11-2 to RR11-3 (art. 11, § 3(2)(b), para. 1052).
Id. at RES2-1 to RES2-2 (Resolution 2).

8Id.

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.

Vol. 16:171

ments for space radio-communication services and their use should not
provide any permanent priority for any individual country or groups of
countries and should not create an obstacle to the establishment of
space systems by other countries.8 9
The existing process accordingly protects subsequent users through
the establishment of safeguards against preemptive restrictions of space
orbit and associated spectrum. For example, the initial formal publication
of a proposed satellite may not commence earlier than five years, nor
later than two years before bringing into service each satellite network of
the planned system.90 Conversely, when a recorded frequency assignment
has not been in use for two or more years, it ordinarily will not be factored into coordinations with subsequent proposed orbit/spectrum assignments."1 The ITU procedures also provide for purging the Master Regis92
ter of recorded assignments that have fallen into permanent disuse.
Thus, ITU procedures accommodate emerging requirements for orbit/spectrum, while limiting the ability of states to arbitrarily preempt
other uses of the geostationary orbit. Indeed, the inability of a user to
effect coordination of frequency and orbital assignments with users of
prior assignments does not foreclose use of the proposed location. The
Radio Regulations explicitly provide that an uncoordinated assignment
may be utilized and protected against future interference, even in the face
of an adverse finding on the issue of potential interference to prior assignments."' If such a station is operated without in fact causing harmful interference for four months after the date that the earlier assignment is
registered for use, it is entitled to be given the same consideration as earlier recorded assignments. 4
Perhaps the main virtue of the existing ITU procedures is their consistency with coexisting regimes, including those established under the
auspices of global and regional multilateral organizations. The ITU does
not formally protect the activities of international organizations as such
11 Id. (emphasis added).
90 Id. at RR11-1 (art. 11, § 1, para. 1042). Similarly, formal notification that coordination has been concluded with affected administrations may be transmitted no earlier than
three years prior to development. Id. at RR13-2 (art. 13, § 3, para. 1496).
"' See id. at RR13-5 (art. 13, § 9, para. 1513). Moreover, when such an assignment is
brought back into use it is subject to further coordination or analysis by the IFRB as of that
date, with respect to potential harmful interference. The IFRB may, on its own motion or
upon information supplied by an administration, modify or cancel the registration of such
assignments whose use has not been discontinued. Id. at RR13-13 to RR13-14 (art. 13, §§
25-29, paras. 1569-75). The time limit for bringing assignment into use may be extended by
four months as of right or for an additional 18 months in "exceptional circumstances." See
id. at RR13-10 to RR13-11 (art. 13, § 18(4), para. 1550).
92 Id. at RR13-14 (art. 13, § 27, para. 1573).
93 Id. at RR13-4 (art. 13, § 8(d), paras. 1506-08).
94 Id.
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since it is a union of sovereign entities. Indeed, the ITU assiduously
avoids acknowledging international organizations in their own right. The
Convention thus promotes equitable access to space orbit and spectrum
for "countries or groups of countries."9 5 On the other hand, Article 40 of
the Convention necessarily provides that "in furtherance of complete international coordination on matters affecting telecommunication, the
Union shall cooperate with international organizations having related interests and activities."9 " The Convention also requires that all radio facilities be operated so "as not to cause harmful interference to the radio
services or communications of other Members or . . . of other duly authorized operating agencies which carry on radio service, and which operate in accordance with the provisions of the Radio Regulations. ' 1"7 This
language is broad enough to encompass international organizations.
The Radio Regulations make express provision for advance publication, coordination and notification of satellite systems by individual administrations on behalf of a group of administrations.98 While recognizing
international systems only as coalitions of individual states, rather than
in their juridic capacity, the Regulations reconcile ITU sovereignty notions with the collective and authoritative decision-making that characterizes international organizations." For their part, the international institutions charged with the governance of multilateral systems have
adapted to the ITU regime. 100 In some cases, organizations have adjusted
their internal procedures to conform with ITU's consensual mode of decision-making, giving nations a unilateral veto over joint action. For ITU
purposes they thereby eschew more authoritative modes even though simple or super majority rule otherwise governs their collective undertakings.
For example, INTELSAT possesses juridical personality, which includes the authority to establish relationships with international organizations and with states. 01 Yet, INTELSAT's procedures for ITU coordination allow individual members to disavow collective decisions on
0 2
satellite system design and location in the context of ITU coordination."
The INTELSAT Board of Governors is empowered to adopt "decisions..
. concerning notification to the [ITU] ... of the frequencies to be used for
the INTELSAT space segment."10 3 However, for purposes of intersystem
coordination, INTELSAT decisions must be conveyed to the ITU by an
"

1982 FINAL AcTS, supra note 4, at Conv. 24 (art. 33) (emphasis added).

Id. at Cony. 27 (art. 40).
97 Id. at Cony. 25 (art. 35).
RADIO REGULATIONS, supra note 6, at RR11-1 (art. 11,'§ 1, para. 1042).
" Id. at RR11-4 to RRII-10 (art. 11, §§ 6-15).
100See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
93

1 See INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 7, 23 U.S.T. at 3822 (art. IV).

1o2 Id. at 3844 (art. X(a)(xxiii)).
103 Id.
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ITU member which serves as a "notifying administration... acting in the
name and on behalf of a certain number of INTELSAT Administrations,"
rather than on behalf of the organization. 10 Similarly, the INMARSAT
Agreement provides expressly that the party in whose territory the organization is located (i.e., the United Kingdom) "shall coordinate the frequencies to be used for the space segment and shall, on behalf of each
Party that consents, notify the [ITU] of the frequencies to be so used...
as provided in the Radio Regulations annexed to the International Telecommunications Convention.

10

5

This provision is consistent with the fact

that the ITU does not legitimize the claims of international organizations,
but, as noted previously, registers assignments only to "countries or
groups of countries."106
The INTELSAT procedures specifically contemplate that notification to the ITU shall be "only... in the name and on behalf of those
Administrations which have agreed that it should do so, in accordance
with the [established] procedures. '11 0 7 These procedures provide for inter-

nal circulation of the ITU coordination filing among all INTELSAT
members and a stringent mechanism to verify their assent to the filing 108
When the coordination filing involves the resolution of any potential interference by a proposed INTELSAT facility with other satellite systems,
individual members may withhold their concurrence from the INTELSAT coordination filing in order to be free to promote, within the ITU
process, whatever interest they may have in the separate system.10 9
A more complex set of arrangements applies when INTELSAT acts
to protect its own space segment against interference caused by separate
systems. Both an ITU procedure and and internal INTELSAT coordination requirement are triggered. As with filings related to the coordination
10 INTELSAT,PROCEDURES FOR COORDINATION, NOTIFICATION AND PROTECTION OF THE

INTELSAT SYSTEM IN ACCORDANcE wrrH PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 9A OF THE ITU RADIO
REGULATIONS, BG-19-57E W/1/76 (Rev.1) 1 (Apr. 5, 1977) (available in the office of the Case
Western Reserve Journal of International Law) [hereinafter cited as PROCEDURES FOR
COORDINATION].
101 INMARSAT

Agreement, supra note 27, 31 U.S.T. at 16 (art. 28). Accord id. at 6
(art. 8). See also EUTELSAT Agreement, supra note 27, SPACE LAW DocumENTs at 476 (art.
8), which contemplates undertaking of "intersystem coordination... [as] necessary in the
field of satellite telecommunications."
1 See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
'07 PROCEDURES FOR COORDINATION, supra note 104, at 1 (emphasis added). Accord INMARSAT Agreement, supra note 27, 31 U.S.T. at 16 (art. 28). The Notifying Administrations may also disclaim the -roposed coordination. PROCEDURES FOR COORDINATION, supra
note 104, at 1. Thus, the process presupposes that the Notifying Administration's role is one
of a passive liaison between INTELSAT and the ITU, while concurrently pursuing unilateral objectives.
108

PROCEDURES FOR COORDINATION,

109 Id.

supra note 104, at 2-3.
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of proposed INTELSAT facilities, INTELSAT's ITU filings in response
to potential interference on the part of separate systems are subject to
the above-outlined internal clearance procedure, 1" but with a significant
distinction. INTELSAT cannot simply note the concurrence or nonconcurrence of individual members, but must be prepared to consider revisions to the proposed text of the ITU filing to take into account objections.' Ideally, an internal consensus is reached within INTELSAT in
order to prevent any divergent opinions within the organization from
spilling over into the ITU forum. If such compromise is not reached, the
dissenting INTELSAT states are free to express and pursue any reservations regarding INTELSAT's efforts to protect its
own system at the ex2
pense of their unilateral service undertakings."
In addition to the normal ITU coordination mechanism, INTELSAT
evaluates any alternative system proposed by a member state according
to separate procedures and technical, and in some cases economic, standards that coexist with the ITU process. The INTELSAT Agreement requires that INTELSAT parties "prior to the establishment, acquisition or
utilization of such facilities, shall furnish all relevant information to the
[organization].1'' 1

INTELSAT's Assembly of Parties, which acts upon

recommendations and advice of its Board of Governors, expresses its findings regarding the technical compatibility of such facilities with the radio
frequency spectruii and orbital space used by the existing or planned INTELSAT space segment." 4 INTELSAT procedures contemplate that the
110 See

supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
supra note 104, at 4.

... PROCEDURE FOR COORDINATION,
112

Id.

113INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 7, 23 U.S.T. at 3854 (art. XIV(d)).
114 Id. at 3853-54 (art. XIV(a)(d)(e)). In addition to technical coordination, INTELSAT
requires economic impact coordination relative to space systems that contemplate the offering of "public telecommunications" services (i.e., telephone, message, data, video, etc.). See
id. at 3816 (art. 1(k)). These services constitute the prime commercial undertaking of the
Organization under Article I of its Agreement. This coordination addresses an obligation
imposed upon members by article XIV(d) to avoid causing significant economic harm to
INTELSAT. Because it transcends the interference considerations that define the scope of
ITU decision-making, full analysis of the economic harm aspect of INTELSAT coordination
is beyond the scope of this paper. The economic issue is highly controversial, however, insofar as it touches openly on commercial issues concerning the financial viability of INTELSAT and affects the interests of such systems. For example, on economic criteria, INTELSAT has extended only a five-year approval of the operation of the EUTELSAT European
satellite system due to its potential to siphon traffic off of INTELSAT's direct routes. See
INTELSAT,REPORT OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS TO THE SEVENTH ASSEMBLY OF PARTIES
PURSUANT TO ARTICLE XIV(D) CONCERNING THE PLANNED EXPANDED USE OF THE EUROPEAN

AP-7-24E (Sept. 16, 1982) (available in the office of the
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law). For a fuller explanation of the development and scope of INTELSAT economic coordination, see R. COLINO, THE INTELSAT
COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE SYSTEM,
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Article XIV process will be concurrent with ITU coordination. The procedures provide for an early informal consultation followed by a more formal process under Article XIV. 115 The informal consultation begins as
early as possible, preferably prior to initiation of the ITU process. This
initial process is intended "to identify possible problems relating to the
eventual establishment of the technical compatibility between the INTELSAT system and the planned separate system [in order to] provide
the opportunity for consideration and discussion of alternatives for
resolving any problems that might arise."'1 6
Formal consultations are commenced thereafter "but well in advance
of the proposed establishment, acquisition or utilization of the [separate]
facilities." 1 7 As dictated by the INTELSAT Agreement, the consultation
considers the interference potential of "the planned system into the existing or planned INTELSAT system," which is different from the mutual interference analysis contemplated under ITU coordination." 8 Moreover, "[a]ny recommendation with respect to Article XIV coordination
should contain provisions including those concerning recoordination ...
in the event that a satellite of the separatesystem must be relocated (for
9
example, because of coordination with a third party).",
This further suggests an emphasis upon adaptation of the separate
system to the needs and requirements of INTELSAT. Because the Article
XIV process transcends the mutual non-interference remedies of ITU
regulations, it is important from INTELSAT's perspective that the separate procedure be preserved. Otherwise, INTELSAT is subject to ITU
standards and procedures that may not afford it special legal status or
recognition vis-a-vis national systems of more limited scope. Nevertheless, the INTELSAT coordination process functions effectively primarily
because Article XIV has been implemented to afford a significant degree
of mutuality. 2 0 There have been some cases in which INTELSAT was
criticized for employing standards that exceeded ITU interference tolerances,' 2' but INTELSAT has since adjusted its interference guidelines in
accordance with the ITU WARC '79 Final Acts and CCIR Recommenda(European Broadcasting Union Monograph No. 9, 1973).
'12 INTELSAT, INTELSAT GuEDELINs FOR INTERSYSTEM COORDINATION, BG-43-71E
W/9/80, at 2-3 (Sept. 18, 1980) (available in the office of the Case Western Reserve Journal
of International Law) [hereinafter cited as INTELSAT GUmmLINsS].
216Id. at 2.
1'7

Id.

11 Id.

(emphasis added).
Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
120 Int'l Communication Hearing,supra note 32, at 102-09.
121 Id. See also Colino, International CooperationBetween Communications Satellite
Systems: An Overview of Current Practices and Future Prospects,5 J. SPACE L. 65 (1977).
129
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tions. 1"' The process is designed to achieve a mutually acceptable result
is "submitted to the IFRB
reflected in a coordination agreement, which
123
as evidence of successful coordination.
INTELSAT's Article XIV procedures are at least indiiectly recognized by the ITU. This indorsement arose at WARC '79 in connection
with a U.S. proposal for the allocation of additional frequency spectrums
to be used for fixed satellite services, including international services
under INTELSAT auspices. At the behest of INTELSAT, the United
States proposed to expand the permissible satellite communication band
significantly by adding certain 2 GHz frequencies in order to meet antici2
pated growth and to provide new INTELSAT service requirements. "
This proposal was rejected by a coalition, mainly of developing countries,
which anticipated use of these frequencies for low cost systems independent of INTELSAT."2 5 The coalition prevailed and these frequencies
were allocated for use in "national and regional systems," omitting the
global systems of INTELSAT.' 2s However, provision was made for use of
the 3400-3700 MHz and 4500-4800 MHz bands for all fixed satellite systems, including INTELSAT. 127 Interim use was authorized on a shared
basis, subject to limitations imposed to protect existing utilization of
these bands by European countries. 28 The footnotes to the Radio Regulathe competing uses of some of
tions indicated an intent to recoordinate
1 29
these frequencies 6n alternative bands.
More importantly, a "Declaration" by a number of developed countries"30 explicitly agreed in principle to support INTELSAT uses of these
frequencies.' 3 ' Despite the fact that the band in question was used by
these countries for radar service vital to defense purposes, they agreed to
use their best efforts to accommodate INTELSAT's requirements by
working within "the normal procedures of the INTELSAT
Organization."' 3'
Despite such acknowledgment of concurrent and co-existing international regimes, the existing ITU coordination process is imperfect from
INTELSAT GuEDELINES, supra note 115, at 1, 4-5, 8-9.
123 Id. at 3.
121 Robinson, supra note 43, at 21-22.
125 Id.
126 See RADIO REGULATIONS, supra note 6, at RR8-109 to RR8-110 n.757 (table of allocation to services).
127 Id. at RR8-116 to RR8-119.
128 Id. at RR8-119 n.792.
129 E.g., id. at RR8-116 n.784.
122

States, Canada, United Kingdom, Belgium and Australia.
M Staff Report to the Commission on the Results of the 1979 World Administrative
Radio Conference, reprintedin WARC-79: Radio Regulations and Final Protocol: Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1982).
230 United

132 See id. at 25 (app. I).
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the standpoint of the non-sovereign entities. Nonrecognition of their legal
identity undermines their collective actions relative to the use of frequency and orbit. Even though an international body may have reached a
binding majority decision on frequency and orbital placement of common
user facilities, it can only approach the ITU as a loose federation of individual countries.' 8 In its adaptation to the ITU process, the organization
must give individual members an opportunity to opt out of collective decisions that otherwise would be binding.134 Moreover, the organization is
forced to rely on the Notifying Administration to convey its coordination
filings. 35 Ideally, the Notifying Administration will serve as a "mailbox"
conduit to the ITU, even though it may not concur in the coordination
filing. The process has worked well in the absence of overt controversy
either between the United States and the FCC, which is the Notifying
Agent on behalf of INTELSAT, or between the United Kingdom INMARSAT Party, which acts as Notifying Agent for the maritime satellite
organization and its client institutions. But there is obvious potential for
mischief in the event that a Notifying Administration half-heartedly supports or is overtly opposed to a particular filing.
Nevertheless, the present system does function to accommodate common user satellite regimes organized under multilateral auspices. It is at
least a vehicle for the participation of international institutions and a
rights vesting mechanism for collective or joint use of the space orbit.
INTELSAT's own studies have concluded that, although not ideal, the
present arrangements "suffice under the present ITU regime, and would
undoubtedly suffice if the present ITU regime were to continue largely
unchanged."13'6 However, as the same study notes ominously, "[I]t is not
at all clear that they would be adequate under all the possible planning
arrangements that the ITU might adopt at the 1985/1988 Space
WARC.,,137

V. TOWARD A NEW REGIME
The call for a World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC) to
consider the issues relating to the use of the geostationary orbit, as expressed in Resolution 3, possibly reflects an attempt to restructure radically the existing ITU rights vesting mechanism. The resolution itself
poses the objective of "equitable access" in light of considerations raised
I"

See supra note 95 and accompanying text.

134 See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.

"I See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
,30 DIRECTOR GENERAL, INTELSAT, PREPARATIONS FOR WARC 85/88, BG-55-77E W/6/
83, at 1 (June 13, 1983) (available in the office of the Case Western Reserve Journal of

International Law) [hereinafter cited as PREPARATIONS FOR WARC 85/88].
17 Id.
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by such factors as (1) the accelerating worldwide requirement for orbital
positions and frequency assignments for space services, (2) the inherent
national limitations upon orbit and spectrum availability, and, (3) the unequal capabilities of countries to presently exploit the orbit/spectrum resources.1 38 On its face, the Resolution does not necessarily invoke a particular remedy nor necessarily disclaim the status quo. However, the call
for a world space radio conference "to guaranteein practice for all countries equitable access to the geostationary satellite orbit and [associated]
frequency bands" 13 9 may be prompted by disquiet over the fact, particularly among developing countries, that the present
regime does not ex40
pressly reserve their future access to the orbit.1
Whether, as a legal matter, Resolution 3's mandate for a space
WARC entails the adoption of so-called a priori planning methods of orbit/spectrum allocation is immaterial. This method of allocation includes
reserving specific slots and frequency assignments for particular countries. Such a reservation system of rights vesting has been associated with
some of the principal architects of Resolution 3,141 particularly the developing countries. Moreover, two of the five "planning" methods officially
under consideration within the International Consultative Committee on
Radio (ITU CCIR) involve world or regional, detailed, long-term and
short-term, a priori allotment planning. Under these methods each ITU
member state would be allotted particular orbit locations, associated frequencies and coverage areas. 4 2 These arrangements among users would
replace the current, fluid and dynamic process of bilateral negotiation
with the most rigid and inflexible alternative possible-a multilateral
treaty that freezes and defines access as of the date of its adoption for the
duration of the plan. 143 The deficiencies of this approach have been repeatedly voiced by U.S. policy-makers: "[T]he two most significant deficiencies of the approach have been amply demonstrated. Technical and
operational innovation are unnecessarily impaired .... Nations are induced to seek assignments that are often far beyond their capability to
utilize in144the foreseeable future, to the possible detriment of other

nations. 11
"'

Resolution 3, supra note 9, at RES3-1.

119 Id. (emphasis added).
140

Rutkowsld, supra note 13, at 23. Accord OBECTmVs AND FRAMEWORK, supra note 14,

at 2.
M Rutkowski, supra note 13. Accord Preparation for ITU WARC, supra note 10, at 1-3
app. B.
141 LW.P. 4/1, supra note 5, at 99-101.
143 See id. for a description of these methods. A third method combines strict planning
with periodic conferences to revise technical parameters and regulatory procedures and
mechanisms to allow access for new requirements between such conferences.
M4Preparation for ITU WARC, supra note 10, at 4, para. 9.
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In addition to a deterrent effect upon innovation and the potential
danger that a reservation approach would allocate orbit/spectrum to
countries without current requirements or capabilities, there is a third,
equally critical problem. A multilateral plan cannot fully accommodate
cooperative common user approaches to orbital access.
While there is no ITU definition of "planning,' 145 the notion of an a
priori plan is generally understood to reflect the assignment of specified
orbital positions and frequencies to individual countries or groups of
countries. This would be accomplished by a detailed reservation plan
adopted at a multilateral conference. Such plans may define, for particular countries or groups, the service parameters and objectives, coverage,
locations, frequencies, power limitations, interference levels, transmission
parameters and other aspects of the use of frequency spectrum at a given
location. 146 Although plans may reflect varying degrees of flexibility, they
generally are predicated upon known or foreseen requirements for orbit/
spectrum use at the time the plan is adopted. The requirements generally
must be acknowledged as such by a majority of the delegations to the
planning conference. Thus, a plan is necessarily the product of political
compromises among sovereign telecommunications administrations.
From the standpoint of common user systems, the political realities
of the planning process reflect a serious drawback. The IWP 4/1 document points out, somewhat glibly, that "due to the broad interest... in
using multi-Administration networks, it should not be difficult to accommodate them.'

47

This supposition, however, is by no means an assurance

that their requirements would in fact be afforded much weight, if at all,
at a conference in which they might participate only as observers. Such
conferences recognize even existing uses only to the extent they gain political support within the ITU. Again, quoting the IWP 4/1: "Existing
networks occupying the orbit may not reflect the interests of all Administrations.' '

48

Indeed, those allotments accepted at the conference would,

as implemented, displace existing networks.
Even assuming that a plan adequately accounted for existing known
requirements of common user systems, it would be difficult, and perhaps
impossible, to account either for new or unforeseen requirements (i.e., expanded service functions) arising after the plan is adopted or for new
common user systems. For example, the Regional Plan adopted for the
"I Id. at 14, para. 34.
146

See, e.g.,

INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION, FINAL ACTS OF THE REGIONAL

ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE FOR THE PLANNING OF THE BROADCASTING-SATELLITE SERVICE IN

REGION 2 (SAT-83) (1983) (available in the office of the Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law) [hereinafter cited as REGION 2 FINAL ACrs].
1,7 I.W.P. 4/1, supra note 5, at 106 (emphasis added).
148

Id.
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Western Hemisphere, while assigning "shared beams" respectively for
certain Andean and Caribbean states, necessarily foreclosed all options
for the shared use of the "beam" save those expressly recognized by the
plan.249 This approach is extremely short-sighted, as an INTELSAT
working paper has observed: "Given the wide range of services that can
be provided by a satellite at a single location, and the ability of international organizations to provide a range of these services, it cannot simply
be assumed that international organizations should be limited to specific
locations exclusively for [a single service]." 150 The IWP 4/1 indeed
concedes:
The only provision for accommodation of new requirements in this
method is if they do not cause unacceptable interference to those networks within the plan. Under such a constraint, the only ways to accommodate new networks would be if unallotted capacity was in the plan or,
if the [planned] requirements occupied all of the capacity when the plan
was established, new networks would need to await technological advancements to create additional capacity.'51

While it would be legally possible to amend a plan, the amendment process, even in the best of circumstances, can be nearly as cumbersome as
convening another general conference. The
amendment process requires
152
the concurrence of all "affected" parties.
These difficulties are further compounded, because, as already noted,
the ITU system does not directly recognize the claims of international
common user systems, as such, except indirectly."5 " International organi-

zations simply do not have parity with nation-states in the substantive
outcome of ITU deliberations.'" However, the articulation of equitable
access principles that afford such parity in a coordination environment
may be feasible. Given the current diversity of providers of satellite service, the resolution of this issue could, but need not, be highly controverSee REGION 2 FINAL AcTs, supra note 146.
PREPARATIONS FOR WARC 85/88, supra note 136, at 2, par. 8.
I51 I.W.P. 4/1, supra note 5, at 106. A short term plan provides only limited relief from
these constraints. Id. at 109. "This method [makes] provision for . . .new requirements
between conferences.... [Moreover], this method would readily accommodate the multiadministration requirements if foreseen when the plan is established." Id. at 109 (emphasis
added).
I See, e.g., REGION 2 FINAL AcTs, supra note 146, at 3, part 1. But see Broadcasting
Satellite Planning Final Acts of WARC '77 which virtually preclude amendments. Accord
149
10

WARC '77 IPLcATIONS, supra note 19.

See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
154International organizations do participate in an advisory capacity in the work of
international and regional conferences and the two consultative committees dealing with
radio (CCIR) and telephony and telegraphy (CCITT). International organizations also share
in the expenses of the Union. See G. CODING & A. RuTKowsKi, supra note 78, at 187-98.
113
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sial. The "common user" concept articulated above would encompass the
relevant institutional actors.
Only a minority of countries are or soon will be capable of enjoying
access to space resources through the construction and erection of their
own satellite systems. Considering this, logic would suggest strong support for the satisfaction of equitable access claims by means of shared
facilities under the auspices of a common, participatory regime:
For many developing countries the likelihood is that several ...services
will be combined and provided in a given country or region by a single
system. Since each service needs only a modest capacity space segment,
this leads to the conclusion that the most economic solution would be the
deployment of satellites to serve large areas with flexible regional/national zonal coverage and a mix of general purpose transponders available for leasing. 15'
In order to succeed, this concept must become powerful enough to overcome ideological, economic and political motivations that support the
view that multilateral sharing arrangements are a second-best solution to
the access controversy.
The ascendance of political values over technological rationality is
pointedly illustrated by certain resolutions of the 1982 United Nations
Conference on Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNISPACE). One resolution exhibited a marked preference for "technological
self-reliance," even at the expense of "efficiency of GSO and RF spectrum
usage."' 156 Thus, spokesmen for "guaranteed" country-by-country access

to their space orbit have made the politically expedient, but technically
unfounded argument that common user facilities, such as platforms, are
"unproven." The UNISPACE resolution states: "[I]t is not yet clear that
[the platform] concept will offer the flexibility required by the varying
and special needs of these countries, lead to lower cost for each of them
and help improve use of GSO and the RF spectrum."" 7 Similarly, one of
the leading exponents of strict a priori planning, the Indian telecommunications advisor, dismisses the option of utilization of INTELSAT capacity for domestic service applications of developing countries: "This can
only be an interim arrangement ...
and as the [domestic] needs
grow .. .beyond a certain capacity crossover point, dedicated domestic!

regional satellites would become attractive."" 58
Such statements betray the true motivation of some of their principal

"' B. Herdan, supra note 56, at 208.
,' Report of the Second United Nations Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space, § G, para. 281 (Aug. 1982) [hereinafter cited as UNISPACE Report]. See also D.
JANsKY, supra note 2, at 3.
,M UNISPACE Report, supra note 156, at para. 286.
158 Srirangan, supra note 11, at 12 (emphasis added).

1984

ALLOCATION OF SPACE RESOURCES

proponents-namely the desire of certain second tier satellite operating
states (i.e., India, Indonesia, Brazil) to establish their hegemony over regional telecommunications. In fact, these particular states historically
have been directly at odds with INTELSAT over the right to use narrow
arc segments that provide coverage in their respective regions beyond
their own territories. 159
VI.

CONCLUSION

Advances in technology which make possible the increased access to
satellite resources have nonetheless not been accompanied by a heightened awareness of the need for cooperative rights vesting mechanisms.
Sovereignty objectives that are served by a movement toward planning
simply are not consistent with the fact that unilateral programs are but
one means of securing equitable access to the GSO. A variety of alternatives exist which satisfy access objectives. Assuming that it is no longer
tenable to maintain the existing regime, it is nonetheless imperative to
prevent the loss of the essential institutional flexibility that is its
hallmark.
Thus, the United States and similar highly developed countries who
have the greatest stake in maintaining the current, relatively loosely
structured regime for GSO access and spectrum use, must nonetheless be
prepared to adjust the traditional structure to reflect a more widespread
demand for access among less developed states. These reforms would include explicit decision-making criteria and institutional checks upon the
existing process to ensure that it accounts adequately for access demands
of LDCs. At the same time, these adjustments should be such as to blunt
simplistic a priori country-by-country approaches that completely ignore
common user access modes.
In a real sense, the issue of ways and means of accommodating common user institutions in the orbit/spectrum rights vesting process is central to the broader equitable access issue. Those countries that are disaffected by the current process may be persuaded to weigh alternatives in
terms of their impact upon the ways that they intend to obtain access in
practice. An a priori regime tends to weigh access objectives of dedicated
systems. The issue confronting technologically disadvantaged states, however, is whether they prefer a planning regime that tends to limit their
service options to shared use of regional systems under the control of individual states, or a regime modeled after the present scheme, which expands their options to pursue either dedicated systems or common user
' See Colino, supra note 121. Indeed, the most strenuous and zealous advocates of a
priori planning in the course of deliberations over Resolution 3 at the 1979 WARC assailed
the existing regime based on these very controversies. Rutkowski, supra note 13, at 23.
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alternatives in which they enjoy active participation and control. When
framed in terms of these choices, the existing regime is far more consistent with equitable access goals.

